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UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain.tiff/Appellee,
v.

MATTHEW JAMES HINMON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, and interference with an arresting officer, a
class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2)(d) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant was caught red-handed selling drugs in a grocery store
parking lot by one of the store's employees. When the store security
officer - a 24 year veteran peace officer with the Division of Wildlife
Resources -went to investigate, Defendant tried to hide the drugs and
resisted arrest.

Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and probable cause to
arrest him. When the trial court denied his motion, Defendant entered a
conditional guilty plea under State v. Sery.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Were Defendant's detention and arrest reasonable under the Fourth
Amend1nent to the United States Constitution?

Standard of Reviezo. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is a
mixed question of fact and law. The factual findings underlying a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are
reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, if 11, 100 P.3d 1222.
The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State

v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, if 15, 103 P.3d 699.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are reproduced
in Addendum A:

• U.S. Const. amend IV;
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305 (West 2013) (interference with an
arresting officer);
• Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8 (West 2013) (possession of a controlled
substance)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary off acts. 1

Tip from a Citizen-Informant
Mark Raines, a long-time Harmon's grocery store employee, went to
his car on a work break and stumbled upon Defendant "selling narcotics."
R284:3-5, 10. Raines noticed the small, green Geo metro parked next to him
because it was "very suspicious." R284:3. The Geo had a welded-shut
passenger side-door and was back-end parked on the west-side of the
building-where employees park-not customers. R284:4-5, 15; R286:B
(Worthington written statement). Raines, who could see clearly into the
Geo, saw Defendant sitting in the passenger seat. R284:4. When Defendant
noticed Raines, he gave Raines a "what are you looking at kind of look."
R284:29. Defendant then "lurched forward and almost kind of covered up
what was going on." R284:4.

1

The facts are taken from the trial court's findings and the record
upon which it relied, including the evidentiary hearing, the preliminary
hearing, and the witness staten1ents. Notably missing from the record is,
Officer Loken' s witness statement, which was relied on by the trial court in
its Ruling. R170-192; see State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 'jf11, 12 P.3d 92
(defendant bears the burden of ensuring the record is adequate and any
gaps in the records are consh·ued against defendant).
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Raines continued to his own car, which was on the driver's side of the
Geo. R284:4. Looking into the Geo from the driver's side, Raines saw that
Defendant had a towel on his lap with about 20 little pink balloons sitting
on top of it. R284:4, 8. Defendant appeared to be manipulating the balloons
with his hands. R284:29; R286:A (Raines written statement). Based on his
own drug history-a past citation for marijuana paraphernalia-and what
he had seen on T.V., and in particular, "court TV, anything like that," Raines
concluded that he was witnessing a drug transaction. R284:4-5, 10.
Raines immediately moved his car to the front of the store, went back
inside the store, and reported what he had seen to his manager, Chris
Worthington, and Harmon's on-duty security officer, Officer Raymond
Loken. R284:5-6. Raines told Worthington and Loken that he saw a small,
green Geo back-end parked "on the west side" of the building, that the
passenger had "a bunch of pink balloons" in his lap, and he believed that
the passenger was selling heroin to the driver. R284:6; 15, 29; R176; R177;
R286:B (Worthington written statement). Loken, a 24 year veteran peace
officer with the Division of Wildlife Resources and part-time security officer
at the store, went to the parking lot to investigate with Worthington and
Raines in-tow. R284:29-30.
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Loken' s Investigation of Raines' tip

After Raines pointed out the car, Loken, with Worthington and
Raines behind, approached the car's passenger-side and peered in. R284:30II

31. Loken saw Defendant manipulating something on the towel in the
middle of his lap." R284:31; R285:10-11.
When Loken tried to get a closer look at what was on the towel, the
driver and Defendant spotted him. R284:31; 285:10-11. Defendant was
startled by Loken, and gave Loken

II

this real deer in the headlights

look."R284:31. Loken then told Defendant, "don't move." R285:11; R175,
R178. Defendant responded by shoving the towel and its contents between
his knees, to the car floor. R285:11. Then, Defendant shouted at the driver,
"take off, take off" and reached for the car's gearshift. R284:16. 21.
Loken's immediate thought was that Defendant was either "hiding
contraband" or "going for a weapon." R285:6-7; 11-13. Thus, Loken reached
into the car through the open passenger window to "try to control"
II

Defendant's hand, and to protect" himself. R285:6.
Loken grabbed Defendant's hands and said "Police officer, you' re
II

under arrest." R285:7, 14. But Defendant continued to struggle." R285:7;
R284:33. Defendant broke his right arm free, reached to the car floor, and
screamed at the driver, "Eat it, eat it" "Start your car," "go, go." R286:B

-5-

(Worthington written statement); R284:32-33. Worthington, who was
outside of the car watching, ran to the car's driver's side, took the keys from
the ignition, and escorted the crying driver from the car. R284:16; R286: B
(Worthington written statement).
As Loken tried to gain conh·ol of Defendant's hands, he repeatedly
told Defendant "[S]top resisting," "[Y]ou're under arrest," "[G]ive me your
hands." R284:33. But Defendant continued to struggle and lurched "really
hard up over the seat." R285:33-34. At that point, Loken had control over
Defendant's left hand, but not his right. R285:33. With his feet on the
passenger side of the car, Defendant heaved his body "between the seats"
"towards the back." R284:33. Worthington then saw Defendant "shove his
hand into his mouth," trying to eat a little pink balloon. R284:16-17. When
the balloon bounced into the back of the car, Worthington reached through
the driver side of the car, retrieved the balloon, and then grabbed
Defendant's right arm. R284:17, 34.
At Loken's request, Raines grabbed Loken's handcuffs and, with
Loken's and Worthington's help, handcuffed Defendant. R284:34. Draper
police arrived shortly thereafter and field tested the substance in the little
pink balloon that Worthington had seized. R285:18; R284:35. It tested
positive for heroin. R285:18.
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B.
~

Summary of proceedings.

Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, and interference with an arresting officer, a class B
misdemeanor. Rl-3. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound
over as charged. R285:21.

Motion to Suppress. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the
balloon and the field test results identifying its contents as heroin, arguing
that the evidence was obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. R7176.

Defendant argued that Loken and Worthington violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause and that
discovery of the heroin-filled balloon was the fruit of the unlawful arrest.
R71-77.
Trial Court's Ruling. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and

heard oral argument. R284, 283. The trial court then denied Defendant's
motion in a 23-page ruling. R170-192. In its ruling, the trial court
acknowledged that there were some inconsistencies in the testimony, but
found that generally, the testimony was consistent. R175. The court also
recognized that this event occurred "very quickly," that [d]ifferent
witnesses observe and remember things differently," and that "testimony
may vary over time." R175-176. The court based its findings "upon the
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record, considering all versions, the thning of the version, the context for
each version," and "the corroboration of each version." R176.
The court then made conclusions of law. R182. First, the court
concluded that Loken and Worthington were acting under color of law, and
thus had to follow the Fourth Amendment. It concluded that Raines was a
citizen-informant. R183.
Second, the court concluded that Loken detained Defendant when he
told Defendant "don't move." R185. The court reasoned that Loken "made
an official show of authority that a reasonable person would interpret as a
command to restrict his movement" and that a reasonable person would not
be "free to disregard" the request. R185. The trial court concluded that
reasonable suspicion supported the Defendant's detention. R185. The court
ruled that Raines was a reliable informant who provided a sufficiently
detailed tip that was verified by Loken. R186-188.
Third, the trial court found that Loken lawfully arrested Defendant
when he physically restrained him. R189-190. The court found that "all of
the events leading up to the arrest" from Raines' tip to Loken grabbing
Defendant, "viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer," amounted to probable cause. R190.
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Last, the trial court concluded Worthington's seizure of the balloon
fell under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment
and that the balloon was admissible at trial. R190-191.

Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal.

Defendant entered conditional

guilty pleas to both charges under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988), reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his suppression
motion. R194-195. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a suspended
prison term of 0-5 years for his possession of a controlled substance
conviction and 180 days in jail for his interference with an arresting officer
conviction. R224. Defendant timely appealed. R238.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress. Defendant first contends that four of the trial court's factual
findings are clearly erroneous findings. He then contends his detention and
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
None of his contentions have merit.
First, a trial court's findings are reviewed for clear error. This Court
will sustain a trial court's factual findings so long as the record contains
some evidence of that finding. A trial court may draw inferences from the
evidence, relying on its own experience and judgment. Here, the trial
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court's findings are supported by the evidence from the preliminary
hearing, evidentiary hearing, and witness statements. But even if the h·ial
court had erred in making any of those findings, those alleged errors do not
undermine the trial court's basis for denying Defendant's suppression
motion.
Second, the trial court properly concluded that Defendant's detention
r'\

w

was supported by reasonable suspicion. An officer can develop reasonable
suspicion from an informant's tip when that the tip has sufficient indicia of
reliability. Here, Raines report of ongoing drug activity provided Loken
with reasonable suspicion. Because Raines was a concerned and identified
citizen-informant, his report was highly reliable. Moreover, Raines' tip was
highly detailed, contemporaneous with the drug activity, and corroborated
by Loken. Therefore, Raines tip alone created reasonable suspicion, and,
under the totality of the circumstances test, Loken, at the time of the
detention had specific, articulable facts that reasonably suggested that
Defendant may be involved in criminal activity. Thus, Loken' s detention
was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Finally, the trial court properly concluded that Defendant's arrest was
supported by probable cause. An officer has probable cause to arrest a
person when the totality of the circumstances supports the reasonable
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inference that a person is committing a crime. Here, probable cause was
established by the information Loken received from Raines, Loken's own
observations, Defendant's furtive movements, his attempts to conceal and
destroy the evidence, and his demand that the driver take off.
ARGUMENT

I.
BOTH DEFENDANT'S DETENTION AND HIS ARREST WERE
REASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Defendant argues that his detention and arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Br. Aplt. 11. Specifically,
Defendant claims that (1) the trial court based its decision to deny his
motion "on four clearly erroneous findings of fact"; and (2) "Loken lacked
reasonable suspicion" to detain Defendant and lacked probable cause to
arrest him. Br. Aplt. 11, 16, 22. These claims lack merit.
A. The trial court's findings were sufficiently supported by the
evidence.
i ,.,\

\/,}/,U

Defendant argues that the trial court made the following four clearly
erroneous findings when it denied his suppression motion: (1) that the Geo
was backed into the parking spot for a "quick get-away"; (2) that Raines
believed a drug transaction was occurring "based on his experience"; (3)
that Loken' s first words to Defendant were "don't move" rather than
"Police, don't move"; and (4) that Defendant "reached for the gearshift and
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told the driver to 'take off' and 'just drive"' before "Loken went into the car
to restrain" Defendant "and effect an arrest." Br. Aplt. 11, 15. The court's

[:1
\ll!jjl

findings and analysis are supported by the evidence and reasonable
inferences from that evidence.
A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. This Court
will reverse a trial court's findings only if they are not adequately supported
by the record, "resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, -;f 25,
108 P.3d 710 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994);

Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,

i111

(trial court's factual findings reviewed for clear

error). A trial court's findings are adequately supported when the record
contains some evidence supporting them. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, i113,
20 P.3d 300; accord State v. Cecil, 2012 UT App 280, if 5, 288 P.3d 22. When the
trial court's findings include inferences drawn from the evidence, this Court
does "not take issue with those inferences unless the logic . . . is so flawed"
that the inference is "clearly erroneous." Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56,
if18, 181 P.3d 791; see also State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978) (trial
court may consider "all of the facts affirmatively shown, as well as any
unexplained areas, and draw whatever inferences may fairly and
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reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light of their own experiences and
judgment").
Defendant first challenges the trial court's finding that the Geo was
backed into the parking spot for a "quick get-away." Br. Aplt. 11.
Defendant does not challenge the finding that the Geo was backed into a
parking space. Defendant only challenges that it was positioned for a quick
II

get-away. Br. Aplt. 11. While Raines did not use the specific words quick
get-away," the trial court could have properly inferred from the evidence
that the car was in fact positioned for a quick get-away. Raines testified that
the Geo was back-end parked, on the side of the building, where employees
park, not customers, and that Defendant was acting suspiciously. R284:4, 5,
15, 29; R285:4. Worthington testified that the keys were in the ignition while
the Geo was parked. R284:21. Given all this evidence, the trial court could
reasonably infer that the Geo was positioned for a quick-getaway. See State
v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993) (fact finders can make inferences

reasonably and logically drawn from the evidence).
Defendant next challenges the trial court's finding that "Raines told
Loken and Worthington that he believed the balloons contained drugs and
that a drug h·ansaction was occurring 'based on his experience."' Br. Aplt.
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12, 15. Specifically, Defendant challenges the trial court's finding that
Raines' knowledge was "based on his experience." Br. Aplt. 12.
Raines expressly testified that he knew that a drug transaction was
occurring based on his prior drug experience, which included a citation for
marijuana paraphernalia, and from "watching TV, court TV, anything like
that." R284:4-5. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that Raines'
conclusion was based on his experience. See John, 586 P.2d at 412 (trial court
is in the best position to decide what weight to give evidence and judge
truthfulness of witnesses); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 967 (trial judge in best
position to assess witness credibility).
Defendant argues next that the trial court erred by finding that Loken
said only "don't move" when Defendant noticed him. Br. Aplt. 12-13, 15.
Defendant argues that Loken said "Police, don't move." Id.
The trial court's finding that Loken said "don't move," and not
"Police, don't move," is based on Loken' s written statement and
f.--,

\iii/ii

preliminary hearing testimony as well as Worthington's written statement.
R174-175, 268:B (Worthington written statement).

Loken wrote in his

written statement that he said, "do not move," and at the preliminary
hearing, he testified that he said "don't move and don't do anything
stupid." R285:6. R174. And Worthington wrote in his written state1nent that
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Loken said, "don't 1nove your hands." 268:B (Worthington written
statement).
Although Loken testified at the later evidentiary hearing that he said
"Police don't move," the trial court found that this later testimony was not
as reliable as Loken's earlier testimony and written statement. R174-175; see

John, 586 P.2d at 412 (trial court is in the best position to decide what weight
to give evidence and judge truthfulness of witnesses). Thus, the trial court's
finding was properly supported by the evidence. See Clark, 2001 UT App 9,
ljl13 (finding need be supported by "some evidence").
But even if the trial court's finding were erroneous, that does not
undermine the trial court's ultimate ruling. The trial court concluded that
Defendant was detained when Loken said "don't move." R185-188. The
result would have been the same had Loken said, "Police, don't move." See

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (person is "seized"
within the Fourth Amendment when "a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.").
Last, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that he
"reached for the gearshift and told the driver to 'take off' and 'just drive'
before "Loken went into the car to restrain" Defendant. Br. Aplt. 13. The
crux of Defendant's challenge is that the trial court misstated the timing of
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the events. Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant does not challenge that he reached for
the gearshift and told the drive to "just drive"; he challenges only that this
occurred before Loken restrained him. Br. Aplt. 13.
The court's finding is supported by Worthington's evidentiary
hearing testimony. R284:16.

At the evidentiary hearing, Worthington

testified that he saw Defendant shove the towel to the car floor, "start[]
yelling to the driver to take off," and "reach[] for the gearshift." R284:16. He
then saw Loken "basically halfway in the car" attempting to restrain
Defendant. R284:16.

Worthington's testimony supports the trial court's

finding. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 113 (holding that trial court's finding need only be
supported by some evidence).
In sum, the evidence considered by the trial court was more than
sufficient to support the trial court's challenged findings of fact.
B.

Defendant's detention and arrest were reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.

Defendant next argues that his initial detention and ensuing arrest
were unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizures. The trial court correctly
concluded otherwise.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "The touchstone" of a court's analysis
under the Fourth Amendment "is always 'the reasonableness in all the
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circu1nstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal
security."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Tern;
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).

Reasonableness "depends 'on a balance

between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security
free fr01n arbitrary interference by law officers."' State v. Warren, 2003 UT
/::\
~

36, ,I25, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)). "The Fourth Amendment is not ... a guarantee against all
searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures."

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
Under

the

Fourth

Amendment,

there

are

three

levels

of

constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and the
public: (1) consensual encounters, (2) investigatory stops, and (3) arrests.
This case involves the latter two.
A level two encounter involves an officer's brief and non-intrusive
investigative detention of a person. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,135, 63
P.3d 650. A level two encounter is a seizure within the Fourth Amendment
and must be justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person
has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.

See State v.

Markland, 2005 UT 26, ,IlO, 112 P.3d 507. While such detentions may not be
based on "inarticulate hunches," an officer is under no obligation to rule out
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innocent conduct before initiating a stop. Id. at if17 (citing United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, if 23,
164 P.3d 397. Simply put, there need only be articulable facts from which an
officer can reasonably infer that criminal activity "may be afoot." See Terry,
392 U.S. at 30.
A level three encounter is an arrest, which must be supported by
probable cause that a defendant has committed or is committing a crime.

State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-618 (Utah 1987). Like reasonable
suspicion, probable cause is an "objective standard," based on the totality of
the circumstances at the time of the seizure. State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,
226 (UT App 1995). To determine whether an officer had probable cause,
this Court examines "the events leading up to the arrest," and "then
decide[s] 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." Maryland

v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
1. Defendant's detention was supported by reasonable
suspicion.

Defendant argues that his initial detention was not supported by
reasonable suspicion. Br. Aplt. 17. He claims that Loken did not have
reasonable suspicion to detain him because Raines' tip was umeliable and
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insufficiently detailed, and because Loken' s observations alone could not
support the detention. Br. Aplt. 17-18, 21. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
As stated, it is well-established Fourth Amendment law that an officer
may briefly detain an individual when he has reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a detention is "dependent upon
both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability." Narvarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). That said, "reasonable suspicion

can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause." White, 496 U.S. at 330. In evaluating whether reasonable
suspicion existed, courts examine the specific and articulable facts
supporting an officer's reasonable suspicion in their totality, rather than
looking at each fact in isolation. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ,I19; Worwood, 2007
UT 47, ,I23; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (adopting
"totality-of-the-circumstances"

approach

to

determining

informant

reliability in place of a rigid, separate-elements test). "It is imperative that
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure" "warrant a man of reasonable
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caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21-22 (quotations omitted).
It is well established that officers can develop reasonable suspicion
based on an informant's tip. See Narvarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1691-92 (anonymous
911 caller's tip, under totality of the circumstances test, had indicia of
reliability to provide officer with reasonable suspicion); State v. Roybal, 2010
UT 34,

'if 'if14-20, 232 P.3d 1016 (identified 911 caller's tip sufficient to

provide reasonable suspicion to effectuate traffic stop).

To determine

whether an informant's tip has the indicia of reliability to provide an officer
with reasonable suspicion, the reliability of the tip and the veracity of the
caller are examined as part of the totality of the circumstances. See

Narvarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687-1689 (United States Supreme Court examined
reliability and veracity of tip information); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 232
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(abandoning rigid legal test in favor of totality of circu1nstances test as
"rigid legal rules are ill-suited"). 2
When evaluating an informant's tip, "reliability and veracity are
generally assumed" if the tip comes from a citizen who receives nothing
from police in exchange for the information. State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104,
if18, 48 P.3d 872; see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, if19 (recognizing "identified
citizen-informant is presumed reliable"). An "ordinary citizen-informant
needs no independent proof of reliability or veracity," and therefore, courts
instead "simply assume veracity when a citizen-informant provides
information as a victim or witness of a crime." State v. Comer, 2002 UT App
219, i122, 51 P.3d 55 (quotations and citation omitted). This is because an
identified citizen's reputation can be assessed and the identified citizen "can
be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated."

2

J.L., 529 U.S.

To the extent that this Court relies on the three-part citizen
informant test set forth in State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ,r,r14-19, 178
P.3d 908, a tip's reliability should be analyzed under the standard set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983). In Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, the United States Supreme Court adopted a
totality of the circumstances approach for analyzing whether reasonable
suspicion exists, abandoning the use of rigid analysis. The United States
Supreme Court uses the totality of the circu1nstances approach for
analyzing whether a tip provides the indicia of reliability to support
reasonable suspicion. See Navarrette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688-1689; White, 496 U.S.
at 331-32; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271-72 (2000); Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S.
690, 695-96 (1996).
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at 270. Identified citizen informants are "high on the reliability scale and are
entitled to a presumption of veracity." State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, i-f10,
191 P.3d 835; Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ,1,116-19 (same); see also Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.4(a) (2007)
(concluding that corroboration is "unnecessary when the reports of one who
appears to be an average citizen are made upon his personal observation of
the commission of a crime.") (quotations and citation omitted).
Here, Raines' report of ongoing drug activity gave Loken reasonable
suspicion to detain Defendant. First, because Raines was a concerned and
identified citizen informant, his report was highly reliable. See Roybal, 2010
UT 34, ~i116-19; Norris, 2001 UT 104, if18; Keener, 2008 UT App 288, ,I10.
And second, nothing Loken observed served to dispel Raines' report. See

Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ,r21 (recognizing officer responded to DUI report is
entitled to rely on report "unless the officer's personal observations or
interaction with the suspect present indications to the contrary").
Indeed, the reliability and veracity of Raines' report was buttressed
by its detail, timing, and Loken's corroboration. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234
(informant's "explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing,
along with a statement that the event was observed first hand entitles the
tip to greater weight"); Narvarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1689 (911 caller's reliable tip
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created reasonable suspicion where tip contemporaneous with event, caller
had eye-witness knowledge); White, 496 U.S. at 331-32 (officer corroboration
of innocent details made anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create
reasonable suspicion).
Raines informed Loken, only minutes after seeing Defendant, that a
drug deal was occurring in the parking lot. R286:6, 15, 29; see also Narvarette,
134 S.Ct. at 1689 (" contemporaneous report has long been treated as
especially reliable"). Raines provided Loken with the location of the car, a
detailed description of the car, and a description of how the car was parked.
R284:6. Raines also described the occupants of the car, that the passengerDefendant-was acting suspicious, had a towel with "a bunch of pink
balloons" on his lap, and that Defendant was manipulating them. R284:4.
And Loken verified Raines' tip. Loken found the car, Defendant, and
the towel exactly as Raines described. See Kaysville CihJ v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d
231, 237 (UT App 1997); accord see Salt Lake City v. Stre~t, 2011 UT .App 111,
Gjf 15,

251 P.3d 862 (officer corroborated tip by "either observing the illegal

activity or by finding person, vehicle, and the location substantially" as
described by informant).

It is immaterial that Loken did not see the

balloons where every other detail provided by Raines was verified. See

White, 496 U.S. at 331 (officer corroboration of innocent details made tip
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reliable). In fact, all of Loken' s observations supported Raines' tip, further
supporting the tip's veracity. See Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ~21 (recognizing
officer entitled to rely on tip "unless the officer's personal observations or
interactions with the suspect present indications to the contrary").
The reliability and veracity of Raines tip alone created reasonable
suspicion. See Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ~~14 n.2, 20-21; Street, 2011 UT App 111,
~9, 251 P.3d. And Loken's own observations added to that suspicion.
Therefore, applying the totality of the circumstances test, the objective facts
confronting Loken at the time of the detention reasonably suggested that
criminal activity involving Defendant "may be afoot," and thus Loken had
reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
Defendant nevertheless argues that reasonable suspicion did not exist
because Raines did not have "any knowledge" to associate the balloons
with drugs and no evidence supported that "Loken knew-from training or
experience or otherwise-that balloons or towels [were] indicative of
criminal activity." Br. Aplt. 18-19. Defendant argues that such knowledge is
not common to members of the public. Br. Aplt. 18.
But as stated, Raines' testified that he believed a drug transaction was
occurring based on his experience- a previous citation for marijuana
paraphernalia-and from "watching TV, court TV, anything like that."
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R284:4. And Defendant failed to show that Raines' past drug history and
knowledge fro1n popular culture is not enough to support that he knew that
he was witnessing a drug h·ansaction. See e.g., State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030,
1032 (UT App 1994) (informant report of cocaine and marijuana was
adequate basis for search warrant, where tip was detailed and informant
was knowledgeable because of prior marijuana use). Indeed, knowledge of
heroin is permeating popular culture, as it is often in the news and depicted
on T.V. shows. See Debbie Dujanovic, Utah Countt; Sees Alarming Spike in

Heroin

Use,

Police

Say,

KSL.com

(aired

April

28,

2014),

https:/ /www.ksl.com/?sid=29679407&nid=1171 (heroin packaged for sale
in balloons; heroin balloons hidden in drug sellers' mouths); Bob Mims and
Erin Alberty, Major Heroin Ring Busted in Salt Lake, Utah Counties, Salt Lake
Tribune

(May 14, 2014), http:/ /www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/57938752-

78/utah-lake-salt heroin.html.esp (balloons used to package and transport
heroin); Utah Lawmaker evaluating needs of SLC homeless witnesses assault cops

seize

heroin

crack

and

cash,

Fox13,

(aired

May

28,

2015)

http:/ /fox13now.com/2015/05/29/utah-lawmaker-evaluating-needs-ofslcs-homeless-wi tnesses-assa ult-cops-seize-heroin-crack-and-cash/

(390

heroin balloons confiscated); Ashton Edwards and Danica Lawrence,

$800,000 drug bust nets heroin, meth, live grenades in Midvale, Fox13, (aired
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September 8, 2015), http:/ /fox13now.com/2015/09/08/401119/;

Bob

Mims, Cops Seize $1M in Heroin from Suspected Mexican Cartel Operation, Salt
Lake Tribune (September 3, 2015), http:/ /www.sltrib.com/news/2908704155/utah-cops-seize-lm-in-heroin. Because heroin is part of the mainstream popular culture, it is reasonable to assume that both a lay-person
and an officer would know that it is trafficked in balloons and would be
able to identify that the circumstances here involved a drug deal.
Moreover, even though Loken did not specifically testify about his
training and experience with drugs, he is a 24 year veteran with the
Division of Wildlife Resources. As such he is a certified peace officer who
completed POST training.

See Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(b)(iii) (West

2015) (law enforcement officer includes Division of Wildlife Resources
conservation officer); Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1.5 (West 2015) (Division of
Wildlife Resources conservation officers have same powers as other law
enforcement officers); Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-205 (West 2015) (law

/'.~\

w

enforcement officers must complete POST training); State v. Skousen, 2012
UT App 325, iflO, 290 P.3d 919 (Division of Wildlife Resources conservation
officer "is necessarily a full-time, permanent employee of the Division of
Wildlife Resources who is POST certified as a peace or a special function
officer.") (quotation omitted). The trial court could reasonably infer,
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therefore, that Loken reasonably suspected that criminal activity may be
afoot, and that drugs were involved because of the totality of the
circumstances and his veteran status as a peace officer. See Workman, 852
P.2d at 985 (fact finders can 1nake inferences reasonably and logically drawn
from the evidence).
Thus, reasonable suspicion supported Defendant's detention.
2. Defendant's arrest is supported by probable cause.

Defendant argues that he was arrested when Loken "attempted to
restrain" his "hands and told him [that] he was under arrest." Br. Aplt. 23.
Defendant argues that Raines' tip, Loken' s observations, and his furtive
movements of shoving the towel to the floor when Loken approached do
not support probable cause for his arrest. Br. Aplt. 23-24. Defendant's claim
is meritless.
a. Defendant was not arrested until Loken restrained him.

An arrest occurs when there is "an actual restraint of the person
arrested or submission to custody." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (West 2014).
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "An arrest requires

either physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of
authority." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). An officer saying
"Stop, in the name of the law!" does "not remotely" meet the requirements
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for an arrest. Id. A person is arrested when there is the "application of
physical force to restrain movement, even when • it is ultimately
unsuccessful[]." Id.
Here, Defendant was not arrested until Loken actually restrained him
and said that "you are under arrest."R285:14. Prior to that moment,
Defendant was only detained. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. Loken seized
Defendant after Defendant shoved the towel and drugs to the floor,
screamed at the driver to "just drive," and reached for the gearshift.
R284:16, 21; R285:6-8. Immediately after those events, Loken told Defendant,
"you are under arrest," and actually restrained Defendant's hands. R285:14;
284:33. That is the moment of arrest, and not before. See Hodari D., 499 U.S.
at 626.
b. Defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause.

A warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
"where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or
is being committed." State v. Hansen, 2011 UT App 242,

,rs, 262 P.3d 448;

accord State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, if 26, 57 P.3d 1052. Probable cause is "an
objective standard" where an officer's subjective beliefs "neither constitute
probable cause nor foreclose a finding of probable cause." Spurgeon, 904
P.2d at 226. To determine whether probable cause exists, this Court makes a
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"practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances"
confronting the officer, there was "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime [would] be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S.
at 238.

In other words, "probable cause does not require more than a

rationally based conclusion of probability." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,
1088 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531,534 (Utah 1994).
The probable cause requirement is satisfied as long as there exists a
reasonable inference that supports a conclusion that the defendant probably
committed the crime, even if there are equally strong inferences to the
contrary. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,I20 (holding that inference of legitimate
behavior "does not negate the reasonable inference" of criminal conduct).
Determining whether probable cause exists depends on an examination of
all the information available to the officer, including an informant's tip and
the officer's own observations. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233
(Utah 1996) (must examine "totality of the circumstances," including the
informants' tips, together with police observations, to see whether probable
cause existed to arrest defendant).
Here, Loken had probable cause to arrest Defendant. Loken' s
probable cause determination was based on Raines' tip, his own
observations and Defendant's attempt to conceal the evidence and flee.
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R285:12-14; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31 (probable cause determined by

examining totality of circumstances); see also Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233
(must examine "totality of the circumstances" for probable cause
determination). When Loken told Defendant "don't move," Defendant's
reaction was to shove the towel and its contents- heroin-filled balloons - to
the floor of the car, tell the driver to "just drive," and reach for the gearshift.
f"'1
v.::I

R284:10-11, 21; R285:l l, 16. Moreover, throughout the entire, incredibly

short episode, Defendant struggled and resisted arrest. R285:14; R284:16-17,
33-35.

Given the totality of the evidence, Loken' s decision to arrest was
supported by probable cause that: (1) Defendant interfered with an
arresting officer; and (2) there was "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime" would be in the car. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305 (West
2014) (interference with an arresting officer); see Trane, 2002 UT 97, ifif30-36

(officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for interference with an
arresting officer when defendant physically struggled against officers and
refused to c01nply with orders.)
A person is guilty of the class B misdemeanor interfering with an
arresting officer when that person has "knowledge" or "should have
knowledge," that a peace officer "is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or
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detention" and that person "interferes with the arrest or detention by" either
using force or refusing "to perform any act required by lawful order" that is
"necessary to effect the arrest or detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2)
(emphasis added).
Here, Defendant actively disobeyed Loken' s order not to move and
immediately h·ied to conceal evidence. R285:11. At minimum, therefore,
Defendant was interfering with a lawful detention. These actions alone
constitute interference with an arresting officer and provide probable cause
for arrest. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305; see also Trane, 2002 UT 97, ifil30-36
(defendant knew that officers were police officers conducting official police
business, and defendant thus had no right to physically resist officer's order
to submit to a search). And even after Loken resh·ained Defendant,
Defendant continued to resist and tried to destroy the evidence - by h·ying
to eat a balloon. These facts provided Loken further probable cause to
arrest.
Defendant's arrest is also supported by the facts suggesting that he
was dealing in contraband. See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, if23, 147 P.3d
425 (concealing evidence probable cause for arrest); see also Trane, 2002 UT
97, if28 (officer has probable cause whenever the crin1e is committed in the
presence). Loken testified he believed that Defendant was "trying to hide or
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get rid of" conh·aband because of his furtive n1ove1nents and Raines' tip.
R285:13. And although Defendant claims Loken could not rely on
Defendant's furtive movements, the law is well settled that furtive
movements when coupled with other facts support probable cause. See
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) ("[D]eliberately furtive actions

and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of
mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors
to be considered in the decision to make an arrest."); see also United States v.
McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 870 (10th Cir. 2012) (officer had probable cause to

arrest defendant during traffic stop after observing defendant kick gun
underneath seat and smelling PCP emitting from car); State v. Holmes, 774
P.2d 506, 511 (UT App. 1989) (acts of concealment or furtive movement are
relevant in establishing probable cause); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 3.6(d) (5th ed.) ("Observation of what reasonably appear to be
furtive gestutes is a factor which may properly be taken into account in
determining whether probable cause exists."). The totality of the
circumstances establish probable cause: Raines' tip, Loken' s observations,
Defendant's immediate attempt to conceal the towel and its contents,
Defendant's frantic reaction to Loken-yelling at the driver to "just drive"
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and reaching for the gearshift. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31 (totality of
circumstances establish probable cause); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (whether
probable cause exists requires common sense assessment of the totality of
the circumstances confronting arresting officer). Indeed, where Defendant
was openly and actively engaging in criminal activity in a public place,
Loken' s only option as a peace officer was to arrest him. See State v. Folkes,
565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) (When officer observes suspicious activity,
"he has not only the right but the duty to make observations and
investigations" to determine if law is violated; and if so, to take such
necessary measures to enforce the law.).
Additionally, Loken's actions were justified under the exigent
circumstances exception. Exigent circumstances are "those that would cause
a reasonable person to believe that [an immediate search or seizure] ... was
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."

State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.) (1984). Exigency "does not evolve
from one individual fact," but from the "totality of the facts and
circumstances." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
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In this case, Loken' s resh"aint of Defendant was necessary to prevent
not only the possible loss of evidence, but also Defendant from fleeing. See
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ~37 (reasonable search where officers prevented

defendant from eating balloon filled with drugs). As soon as Defendant saw
Loken and Loken told him "don't 1nove," Defendant tried to conceal the
evidence, and to flee. R285:11; 284:16. These events occurred quickly. Loken,
G

as the lone officer at the scene, faced a choice of acting immediately to
protect the evidence and enforcing the law or allowing Defendant to leave.
Loken did not have time to call for back-up, set-up a perimeter, or
investigate further. See Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1260 (exigent circumstances existed
for search and arrest where officers had no advance information about drug
buy or defendant, saw defendant, and could not protect against defendant's
escape); Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127 (officer has duty to enforce law). Indeed,
Loken' s only option was to seize Defendant to prevent the destruction of
evidence and flight of Defendant. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ~36 (officers not
required to allow defendant to swallow drugs). Thus, Loken was also
justified in seizing Defendant to prevent him from fleeing or concealing the
drugs.
In arguing to the contrary, Defendant asserts that his case is just like
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), State v. Parke, 2009 UT App 50,
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205 P.3d 104, and State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (UT App. 1989). Br. Aplt. 26
But none of these cases address the situation here, where Defendant was
conducting a drug transaction in a public place as a passenger in a parked
car and was discovered by a reliable citizen-informant whose tip was
confirmed by the arresting officer. See State v. Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, 12
182 P.3d 385 (search and seizure cases are fact-dependent).
In Schossler, the evidence was suppressed because the officer,
following a tr~ffic stop, based his search of the car solely on the passenger's
behavior of "bending forward, activing fidgety, turning to the left and to the
right," then looking at the officer. 774 P.2d at 1134. In Parke, the defendant's
"somewhat agitated" reaction to the officer's request during a traffic stop
did not, by itself, support probable cause. 2009 UT App 50,

,rs.

And in

Holmes, the defendant's attempt to stuff a roll of paper towels in between
the car seats during a tTaffic stop did not, by itself, establish probable cause.
774 P.2d 506. As discussed, there was much more here.
Unlike these cases, Defendant was not stopped for a traffic violation.
Rather, Defendant was parked in a public place conducting a drug deal, and
upon being surprised by Loken, actively shoved the towel and its contents
to the floor. Thus, Loken did not rely solely on glances or arguably innocent
movements, as did the officers in Schosslet, Parlee, and Holmes. Rather, Loken
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relied on all the evidence to support probable cause: Raines tip, Raines'
statement that Defendant was conducting a drug transaction, his own
observations, and Defendant's furtive motions. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65
(probable cause to arrest 1nay be based on deliberately furtive actions
coupled with officer's specific knowledge.). Thus, Schossler, Parke and Holmes
are inapplicable.
Finally, Defendant argues that this Court's fooh1ote in State v.

Martinez supports his argument. Br. Aplt 25. In Martinez, footnote 3 states
that the defendant's and passenger's behavior of looking like they were
putting something on a car floor as the officer effectuated a traffic stop
"does not establish reasonable, articulable suspicion." 2008 UT App 90, if 2
n.3. But this Court upheld the search and detention in Martinez, because just
like Defendant's case here, the totality of the circumstances supported the
officer's actions. Id. at if 28.
In sum, the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's ruling
that Defendant's detention was supported by reasonable suspicion and that
his ensuing seizure- either to arrest or to prevent escape and desh·uction of
evidence-was supported by probable cause. The trial court, therefore, did
not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on September 28, 2015.
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a courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf):
0 was filed with the Court and served on appellant.
□

will be filed and served within 14 days.
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U.S. Constitutional Amendment IV. Search and Seizure

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

§ 76-8-305.5. Failure to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer

A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who flees from or otherwise attempts to
elude a law enforcement officer:
(1) after the officer has issued a verbal or visual command to stop;
(2) for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and
(3) by any means other than a violation of Section 41-6a-210 regarding failure to stop a
vehicle at the c01mnand of a law enforcement officer.

§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts--Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionallv:
.,
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a conh·olled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first
degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony,
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or.
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule Vis guilty of a
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the
h·ier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven
years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be
suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties:

(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control o.f any building, room,
tenement, vehicle, boat aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit
them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled
substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convi~ted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third
degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person1s conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree
greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed
in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-131 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect
to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetenninate
term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to
run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)( d), the person may be sentenced to imprisom11ent for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
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(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's
body any measurable amount of a conh·olled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner,
causing serious bodily injury as defined inSection 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person 1s body:
(i) a conh·olled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a conh·olled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4
(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree
felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or Vis guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury
or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-378 (2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or,
for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent
oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian,
or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person
known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the
administration o.f any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the
person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud,
forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance,
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under
the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed
to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,

imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit conh·olled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized und er this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58,
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation
Conh·olled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is conm1itted:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the groun ds of any of
those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the
grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other sh·ucture or grounds
which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or tlu·ough a
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping m all, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse,
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds
included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or .
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that ,,vould
otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first
degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be susp ended, and the person is n ot
eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
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(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits,
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was
unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title
77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge
has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance
agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a
bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, dish·ibuted, or dispensed a
conh·olled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons
did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and
supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new

drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or
research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's
employment.
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian,
as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote .for
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used,
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative
defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days
prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to
the charges.
(13)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered
a conh·olled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:
(i) was engaged in medical research; and
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-376.
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if:
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher.
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less
restrictive than any provision of this chapter.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

'\(jJ

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING

Plaintiff,

Case No. 131401457
vs.
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW
MATTHEW HINMON,

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on June 24, 2014, on defendant's
motion to suppress for unconstitutional search and seizure. The state was represented by
William J. Carlson; defendant was represented by Heather Chestnut. The Court heard
argument, took the matter under advisement and set a scheduling conference for July 10, 2014,
which was rescheduled for July 21,_2.(114.._AUbas. .cb.e.d.uling_confe.r:ence
.
. ._onJuly.21,---2014-,-th~e'--------Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress for unconstitutional search and seizure and
stated that a written ruling would follow. The Court having reviewed the pleadings, other
documents, and arguments hereby enters a written ruling.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was charged with one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(A){I), and one count of interference
with arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 76-8-305, on
November 14, 2013 relating to an incident that occurred on September 19, 2013. In support of
the charges, the state's evidence includes a pink balloon, the contents of which field tested
positive for heroin.
On May 23, 2014, defendant filed a motion to suppress the pink balloon and field test
results based upon the exclusionary rule arguing the pink balloon was obtained as the result of
1

0000170

an unlawful search and seizure and therefore is fruit of the poisonous tree that should be
exciuded.
On June 6, 2014, the state filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to
suppress.
On June 23, 2014, defendant filed his reply memorandum to state's opposition to
defendant's motion to suppress.
Oral arguments were heard on June 24, 2014, and the Court took the matter under
advisement.
On July 10, 2014, defendant failed to appear and the Court informed the parties she was
taking additional time to issue her decision.
On July 21, 2014, the rescheduled hearing was held where the court announced its
decision and stated written findings and conclusions would be entered. The following findings
offact and conclusions of law reflect the basis of the Court's decision to deny defendant's
motion to suppress for unconstitutional search and seizure.

BASIS FOR THE FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact are based upon: {1) three handwritten witness statements dated
September 19, 2013, (2) February 11, 2014, Preliminary Hearing transcript ("PH"), and (3) April
3, 201-4,-n-identia-ryitearing-transcript-('"EH"J:---Thewrittenwi-rness statements of Raymond
Loken ("Officer Loken"), Walter Mark Raines ("Mr. Raines"), Craig Worthington, ("Mr.
Worthington") were submitted as exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. Transcripts of both
hearings were filed with Defendant's initial Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress for
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure. The preliminary hearing includes the testimony of Officer
1

Loken and Officer Dustin Willie ("Officer Willie"). The evidentiary hearing includes the
testimony of Mr. Raines, Mr. Worthington, and Officer Loken.

1

The Court notes the State argued in its brief that the preliminary hearing "is not helpful to this
court because: 1- it was before a different judge, 2- its transcript was not admitted into
evidence, and 3- the issue at preliminary hearings is only whether there is 'evidence sufficient
to support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the charged crime. 111 The Court is
not persuaded by the State's arguments. Preliminary hearings are part of the record and
transcripts of those hearings are routinely used as a basis of facts when deciding pre-trial
motions such as the present motion to suppress.
2
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For the most part, Officer Loken's written statement and testimony at the hearings are
consistent. At the evidentiary hearing, the Court found Officer Loken responsive and credible,
and his testimony reliable. Although generally consistent, there are instances where Officer's
Loken's written statement and testimony at the hearings differ.
One example of when Officer Loken was different relates

to what Mr. Raines told him

before he approached the car. Officer Loken's written statement stated Mr. Raines alerted him
"that there were suspicious circumstances in a Green Chevy passenger car on the west side of
the store." At the preliminary hearing, Officer Loken testified that he had asked Mr. Raines
what he had observed and he told me he was getting ready to leave, he had
walked out to his vehicle and in the course of going out passed by a car that was
parked on the west side of the store. When he glanced in the car, it was
occupied by 2 people and he said they were doing something that to him,
appeared suspicious so he kinda stared um and then the male that was in the car
looked at him and either gave him

a look or said something to the effect of 'what

are you lookin at.' And Mark just got in his car and drove around to the front of
the store and at that point he parked in front and came inside to tell me what he
had just seen. PH 3-4.
-----Mt-the-evident-iary-h-eafiflg,0f-fieer-1:ok-en-t-es-tif1ed.._,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Uh Mark said he had been going out to his vehicle which was parked along the
west side of the building and as he approached his vehicle he had passed this ...
a green passenger car and um he said he just glanced into the passenger side of
the ... of the vehicle and whoever was there he said ... he said they gave him a
... a 'what are you lookin at kind of look,' which he said caught his attention. So
as he got around to get in his vehicle he was able to look through the driver's
window to the entire front compartment of the passenger car and he said the
guy had a towel across his lap and he was fiddling with something that looked
like balloons on his lap .... he thought that it was a drug transaction that was
going on. EH 27-28.
On cross examination at the evidentiary hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

3
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Defense Counsel:

Now it's true wasn't it that nobody mentioned balloons to you
[before you approached the car] did they?

Officer Loken:

Um if... if he did that's the part I don't really recall, I just know he
said that he had things in his lap that .... and a towel across his
lap, he might've said that to Craig .... I might.... but I don't ...
.he didn't specifically look at me and tell me that, so.

Defense Counsel:

About balloons you mean?

Officer Loken:

Yes.

Defense Counsel:

Kay. So your just general information was maybe ... suspicious,
maybe there's a drug deal?

Officer Loken:

Yes.

EH 35.
The brevity of Officer Loken's handwritten statement is not surprising because it is more work
to write about an event than to talk about it. The Court frequently receives evidence of a brief
written statement and then oral testimony that expands upon it. Although the statement is
earlier in time and considered most reliable, the testimony does not "conflict" with the written
statement as much as it expands upon it. Officer Loken's testimony at the hearings is generally
onsiste-At.-T-he-dfff-er-en€e-in-Gf.fieer-b0ken~-t-estimony-rel-ates-t0-the-addition-th-at-Mr-;-R-aines

-----b

1

told Officer Loken he saw balloons in defendant's lap and that he thought it was a drug
transaction. Although this recitation of what Mr. Raines told him is different than Officer
Loken's preliminary hearing testimony and cross examination testimony at the evidentiary
hearing, it is supported by Mr. Raines and Mr. Worthington.

Mr. Raines's handwritten statement recited that he told Mr. Worthington there was an
illegal transaction going on in the parking lot. Mr. Raines also stated:
[Mr. Worthington] and [Officer Loken] came out and I informed them where the
car was and went to park my vehicle. I was then radioed over to help. When I
approached I saw both [Officer Loken] and [Mr. Worthington] trying to detain
the suspect. He was screaming, 'Eat it, Eat it.' I saw him trying to put pink
balloons into his mouth.

4
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. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Raines testified that he said to Officer Loken and Mr.
Worthington, "I said to 'em I was like yeah they're just over there and he's got.... right on his
lap he's got a bunch of pink balloons going right here." EH 5. On cross examination,
defendant's counsel asked him about not mentioning he saw the pink balloons earlier in his
written statement and Mr. Raines responded, "Yes saying that he rearranged something as in
he ... to me I ... he was kind of trying to hide it right at first but then I did see the balloons."

EH 9. Mr. Raines admitted that he did not put that earlier in his written statement and when
defense counsel asked why, he responded, "The only thing I can think of is that at that point I

had already been about an hour and a half out ... out of work and dealing with this situation
and uh I seemed to be little too brief.

11

EH 9. The Court finds Mr. Raines's testimony believable

and explanation reasonable.
Mr. Worthington's handwritten statement states thatat 5:20 p.m., he and Officer Loken
were alerted by Mr. Raines that "a couple in a green car that looked very suspicious and had
what appeared to be heroin on the passenger's lap." At the evidentiary hearing, Mr.
Worthington testified that Mr. Raines told him and Officer Loken that "he [Mr. Raines] had seen
a towel on the passenger's lap with some little pink balloons on it and that we needed to go out
and probably take a look at it." EH 14. The Court finds Mr. Worthington's testimony credible.
--------1A-summar-y,t-he-c-ertsist-ency-of-both-Mr;-Rainesnnd-Mr.-W-orthirrgto11-'rte-stiTI'fCffi
leads the Court to believe that Officer Loken's testimony that Mr. Raines told him and Mr.
Worthington that defendant had balloons and suspected a drug transaction is true and that his
failure to include it in the written report and inability to recall that fact during cross
examination at the evidentiary hearing does not change the fact that Mr. Raines told him and
Mr. Worthington that defendant had balloons and suspected a drug transaction.
Another example of Officer Loken's differing statements relates to what he said when
the car occupants noticed him. Officer Loken's written statement states that when he
approached the car and was noticed by the occupants: "Figuring drugs I [said] to both persons
in the car to 'do not move.' [Defendant] drove his hands and towel to the floor as I said 'Police,
You are under arrest."' Officer Loken's testimony at the preliminary hearing was:

5
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At that point um I. .. I told'em ... there was 2 things I said, one was 'don't move'
and 'don't do anything stupid.' ... Well I could see the startled look on Mr.
Hinmon's face and at that point he grabbed for whatever was in the center of
the towel and I still hadn't seen it and shoved his hands towards the floor boards
between his legs in the car. And at that point my thought was either A, he's
hiding contraband or he's going for weapon. PH 5-6.
Officer Loken's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that when defendant noticed him:
he got a real deer in the head lights look, big eye's, froze for a second. At that
point I said 'police officer, don't move.' .... Well, after I said "police, don't
move" um af... there was just a momentary hesitation and then Mr. Hinman
taking his hands were already down in his lap, grabbed whatever was there in a
bunch and threw his hands towards the floor of the vehicle. . . . Well almost
instantaneously 2 thoughts went through my mind, 1. He's trying to hide stuff,
the other is he could be going for a weapon. EH 29-30.
Mr. Worthington's written statement was: "Lokken stuck his head in and said 'don't
move your hands' the suspect shoved his hands down into his lap [and] then down to the floor,
Loken then stated 'your under arrest give me your hands."' At the evidentiary hearing, Mr.
Worth ingto n-testified:-1lt.Jm-and-as-we--waike-d-up-1-could-s-e-e"""2-in-d ividualnittinffinth-ec-cn-a-n-d·
Officer Loken came· up kind of the back of the car kinda peeked in over the shoulder of the
passenger and was looking down at what they were doin and said something like 'stop, put
your hands down, police;' or 'police, put your hands down."'
In summary, although there are differences, the testimony of both Officer Loken and
·Mr. Worthington thaf Officer Loken first told the occupants, "Don't move," is both in their early
written statements and their later testimony; thus, the Court finds that that statement was
made. This event happened very quickly. The Court understands that it would be easy to hear
the "police" and "arrest" as part of the statement. However, the court believes that Officer
Loken said, "Don't move" and, when defendant reacted, he said, "police" and "arrest."

6
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The Court recognizes that witnesses' observations and memories may change

over time and differences may arise. Different witnesses observe and remember things
differently and, thus, testimony may vary over time and between witnesses.
The Court went through these few examples of differences in Officer Loken's version of
events to show the process that the Court went through to make the following findings of the
fact. Each finding was made based upon the record, considering all versions, the timing of the
version, context for each version being given, and the corroboration of each version. Based
upon the record, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On September 19, 2013, Mr. Raines, a produce clerk at Harmon's Grocery in a nice area
of Draper in Salt Lake County, went to his vehicle in the West side of the store parking
lot during his afternoon break. PH 3; EH 2-3, 6, 22, 34.
2. While walking to his car, Mr. Raines observed in the stall next to his a green Geo Metro
backed into the stall with a passenger door that was welded shut. EH 3.
3. When Mr. Raines looked into the Geo, he observed two people, including defendant
who was "a young man on the passenger side and [defendant] became very suspicious
as soon as [Mr. Raines] looked over" and "gave him a look or said something to the

effect-of-wh at--are-youiookinpt"-p 1=1-3;-1:H-377~2;-27;-35.
4. Mr. Raines observed defendant lurch forward to cover up what was going on. PH 3, 6.
5. Since the Geo was pulled in backwards and Mr. Raines was pulled in forward, Mr. Raines
walked around to the other side of the Geo and looked into the Geo through the driver
side window. EH 3.
6. Mr. Raines saw "a towel over [defendant's] lap with a bunch of pink balloons sitting on
top of them and what appeared to [Mr. Raines] to be a transaction between the driver
and the passenger." EH 3, 7, 22.
7. Mr. Raines believed he was observing an illegal drug transaction, specifically that
defendant was "selling narcotics to the driver" and "he assumed it was heroin." EH 4,
28; Raines and Worthington's witness statements.
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8. Mr. Raines radioed into the grocery manager, Mr. Worthington, and recalls saying,
"Craig, you need to come out here there's ... there's a transaction going on right in our
parking lot on the employee side." EH 5.
9. Mr. Raines did not describe the type of transaction at that time. EH 5.
10. Mr. Raines moved his car about 30 feet to the front of the store. PH 4, EH 5.

11. Mr. Raines met Mr. Worthington and Officer Loken, a part time Harmons' security guard
in a public safety uniform that looks like a police officer's uniform. PH 4-5, 11; EH 14, 29.
12. Officer Loken is also a full time conservation officer with the Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources ("DWS"). PH 2; EH 26.

13. Officer Loken was not wearing his DWS issued uniform, but was wearing his DWS issued
safety belt,

which included a gun. PH 5, 11-12.

14. When Mr. Worthington and Officer Loken came out of the store, Mr. Raines pointed out
the Geo. PH 3-4; EH 5, 14, 27-28.

15. Mr. Raines told them that when he was taking a break he noticed a green Geo was
backed into the stall and parked on the west side of the store near his car. When he
glanced into the Geo, it was occupied by two people and appeared suspicious so he
stared at them. The passenger, who was later identified as defendant, looked back

at

-·-- ----him-and-gave-him-a-leek-er-s-ald-s-emet·hing-rike~What-are-you-lookin¼t?ll_Mr;-Ra-ines
believed the passenger in the Geo was selling heroin to the driver; he told Mr.
Worthington and Officer Loken that the passenger, defendant, "got ... right on his lap
he's got a hunch of pink balloons going right there." EH 3, 5-7, 14, 22-23, 27-28.
16. Officer Loken proceeded to the Geo with Mr. Worthington in tow and Mr. Raines
followed soon thereafter. PH 4, 10; EH 5, 28; Officer Loken, Worthington and Raines'
witness statements.

17. Officer Loken approached the Geo to "see what's goin on. 11 PH 4.
18. Officer Loken approached the rear of the Geo without being noticed and was able to
look in over the shoulder of the passenger into the passenger compartment of the car.
PH 4; EH 14, 28, Officer Loken's witness statement.
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19. Officer Loken observed through the open passenger side window the defendant "with

like a towel across his lap and he was doing something ... manipulating something
down there that I really couldn't see,

so I bent down closer to try to get a gooder. . . a

better view of what was going on." PH 5, 10-11; EH 16, 28-29; Officer Loken's witness
statement.
20. The driver was looking over toward defendant when she saw Officer Loken and seemed
startled. PH 5.
21. Defendant turned and looked at Officer Loken, who said, "Don't move." Officer Loken's

witness statement; PH 5-6.

22. Defendant responded by grabbing the center of the towel and shoving it between his
legs, hunching down toward the floor boards, and yelling to the driver to "take off, take
off," and "Just drive, just drive" while he was reaching for the gear shift to put the car in
drive. PH 11; EH 14-15, 18-19, 30.

23. Officer Loken thought defendant was going for a weapon or had "contraband that he
was trying to hide or get rid of or do something with." PH 6, 11-13; EH 30; Officer
Loken's witness statement.

24. Officer Loken reached in to the open window to control defendant's hands to protect
--------nimseff-because-weapons-are-ofterrhidden-under-the-se-at-orby-the··p-ass-enger's-fe·et~rl-· -- -- ·----- -

6, 13; EH 30-31; Officer Loken's witness statement.
25. Officer Loken had not seen anything up to that point that showed defendant possessed
contraband or a weapon. PH 13.

26. Officer Loken was not told that defendant had a weapon. PH 13; EH 35.
27. Officer Loken had neither met defendant nor had prior experience with him. PH 13.
28. As soon as defendant lunged for the floor, pushing everything off of his lap, Officer
Loken "reached in to grab'em" and said, "Police officer, you're under arrest.'' PH 6, 14;

EH 30.
29. Defendant struggled against Officer Loken's restraint. PH 6.
30. It was a very awkward position for Officer Loken to restrain defendant through the

window. PH 5-7.
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---

31. Officer Loken told defendant, "Just give me your hands." PH 6.
32. Defendant continued to struggle without being combative or trying to punch Officer
Loken, but just kept trying to get free. PH 6.
33. Defendant said to the driver, "Start the car! start the car! Go! Go!" Worthington's
witness statement; PH 7; EH 31.
34. When defendant told the driver to start the car, Officer Loken looked into the driver's
eyes and said, "Don't start the car." PH 7; EH 31.

35. The driver put up her hands to show she was not going to start the car. PH 7; EH 31.
36. Mr. Worthington reached in and removed the keys from the ignition. EH 15, 19.

37. Both Mr. Worthington and Mr. Raines attempted to open the passenger side door, but it
was welded shut and could not be opened. PH 15; EH 20.

38. Defendant got his right hand free and reached up towards the driver with a clenched fist
and said, "Eat it! Eat itl" Officer Lokken and Raines' witness statements; PH 7; EH 31.
39. Officer Loken told the driver, "Don't eat that" and the driver started to cry. PH 7; EH 31.

40. Mr. Worthington returned to the driver side door, opened it and pulled the driver out of

the car and told

her to sit down and stay there. PH 15; EH 15, 20; Worthington's witness

statement.

---41-.-T-he-d r-iver-eemp Hed ;-EH-15,---20.
42. Defendant struggled harder against Officer Loken's restraint to the point he twisted up
over the car seat and "lurched to the back uh the backseaf' so his head was in the back
of the car with his feet on the passenger seat. PH 7-8; EH 20-21, 31-32.
43. Officer Loken had a hold of defendant's left hand, but not his right. PH 8; EH 32.
44. Officer Loken kept saying things to defendant like, "Quit resisting us. Give me your
hands. You're under arrest." PH 8; EH 31. Mr. Worthington recalled Officer Loken kept
telling defendant to "Stop. I'm police. Stop, you need to quit resisting. Quit resisting ....
Stop resisting arrest." EH 19.
45. Mr. Raines observed defendant "trying to swallow the balloons. So he was literally
grabbing balloons that kind of got scattered and were trying to swallow them [and Craig
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and Ray were] trying to stop him from swallowing the balloons." EH 10, 32; Raines and
Worthington's witness statement.

46. Mr. Raines "leaned in a little bit to kind of help to stop him from swallowing balloons."
EH 11.
47. Mr. Worthington observed defendant shove his hand in his mouth and as he did it, a
little pink balloon bounced into the rear seat of the Geo. PH 8-9, 15; EH 15, 20-21;
Worthington's witness statement.

48. Officer Loken heard Mr. Worthington say that defendant's "trying to swallow
something." PH 8, 15.

49. Mr. Worthington grabbed the pink balloon. EH 21; Worthington's witness statement.
50. Mr. Worthington held it in his right hand, while trying to get control of defendant's right
hand. EH 15-16, 21.
51. Officer Loken obtained control of defendant's left hand. PH 8; EH 32.

52. Officer Loken asked Mr. Raines to grab his handcuffs from his belt because he could not
reach them. PH 8; EH 32, 34.

53. Mr. Raines retrieved the handcuffs and put them through the window, so Officer Loken
could put the handcuffs on defendant's left hand. PH 8; EH 32; Officer Loken and
Raines' witness statement.

54. Mr. Worthington had control of the defendant's right hand, so they were able to
handcuff defendant. PH 8; EH 21, 32.

55. They removed defendant from the Geo. PH 8; EH 22, 32.
56. The contents of the pink balloon were field tested by Officer Willie of the Draper City
Police Department. PH 17.

57. The balloon contents field test results were positive for heroin. PH 17.
58. Defendant was charged with one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 58-37-8(2)(A)(I) and one count of
interference with arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §

76-8-305 on November 14, 2013.
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LAW
The "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" requires that evidence obtained through a
violation of a constitutional right be excluded. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The right to be free from warrantless searches

and seizures is one of the most cherished rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ~ 21, 57 P.3d 1052. Fourth Amendment protections apply to
"activities of sovereign authority and is [generally] not applicable to the searches and seizures
by any persons other than government officers and agents." State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991
(Utah 1972). However, Fourth Amendment protections still apply to "[a) search conducted by a
private person acting as the agent of a governmental authority.... " State v. Watts, 750 P.2d

1219, 1221 (Utah 1988}.
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between law
enforcement officers and the public:

(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; [and) (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being
committed. State v. Alvey, 2007 UT App 161, ,i 4, 577 Utah Adv. Rep. 15.
Both parties concede that the encounter between Officer Loken, Mr. Worthington and
defendant was not a consensual interaction. Consequently, the court focuses on the law of a
level two investigative detention and level three arrest. A level two seizure is an investigative
detention.
Justification for an investigative detention exists when an officer has reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective
basis, supported by specific and articulable facts. Courts should evaluate these
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facts in their totality, rather than looking at each fact in isolation. Although the
standard requires more than an inchoate and unparticularized ... hunch .... [i]t
does not require an officer to rule out innocent conduct or establish the
likelihood of criminal conduct to the same degree as required for probable
cause. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,J 23, 164 P.3d 397, 581 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Circumstances that might indicate that a level two seizure or investigative detention has
occurred include "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55, ,1 11 (internal
quotations omitted).
To justify a level three arrest, there must be probable cause that defendant has
committed or is committing a criminal offense. "Probable cause exists where the facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
"Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. ... [A] search with~ut approval of a judge is
unreasonable unless subject to one of a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions. One such recognized exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon
probable cause under exigent circumstances." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, '1122, 57 P.3d 1052,
456 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS
Defendant seeks to suppress a pink balloon field tested positive for heroin because: (1)
it was discovered by Officer Loken, Mr. Worthington and Mr. Raines while they were acting as
agents of the state, under the color of law, thereby subjecting the search and seizure to state
and federal constitutional protections, and (2) the pink balloon was discovered during a
13
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warrantless search that lacked constitutional justification, therefore it should be suppressed as
fruit of the poisonous tree.
COLOR OF LAW
Defendant first argues that Officer Loken and those who aided him were acting under
the color of law, and were required to abide by the Fourth Amendment.
The state agrees that Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington were acting under color of
law. However, the state argues Mr. Raines was not acting under color of law, rather Mr. Raines
was acting as a citizen informant reporting possible criminal activity.
In reply, defendant did not oppose the state's argument that Mr. Raines was acting as a
citizen informant. Therefore, there is no dispute that (1) Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington
were acting under the color of law and were required to abide by the Fourth Amendment, and
(2) Mr. Raines was acting as a citizen informant, not under the color of law.
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
Next, defendant argues that Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington violated defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights by performing an arrest without probable cause, and argues the fruit
of this search should be suppressed. Specifically, defendant argues that Officer Loken's
immediate interaction with defendant was to give commands and effect an arrest. Defendant
, argues he was arrested from the moment of his encounter with Officer Loken and at that time
there was no probable cause justifying arrest, indeed, that there was not even reasonable
suspicion. Defendant compares Officer Loken's physical struggle to a Terry frisk. The balloon
with heroin was discovered in defendant's car because of this unconstitutional arrest.
Defendant argues that the balloon is the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation, and therefore
should be suppressed.
The state argues that when Officer Loken told defendant "don't move," it was not an
arrest. Rather, Officer Loken began a level two encounter based on articulable suspicion from a
citizen informant that defendant was in the middle of a drug deal. The state argues defendant
throwing his hands to the floor created exigent circumstances that justified Officer Loken
grabbing his arms. Furthermore, the state argues that when defendant threw his hands to the
floor, Officer Loken had probable cause to arrest defendant for resisting detention. The state
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argues that grabbing defendant's arms is not analogous to a Terry frisk because Officer Loken
was not performing a pat down. The state argues that the balloon is not the result of a Terry
frisk, it's what is left of defendant's attempt to destroy evidence. The state argues that
defendant's motion to suppress the balloon should be denied.
In reply, defendant did not oppose the state's argument that Mr. Raines was acting as a
citizen informant. However, defendant opposes Mr. Raines's testimony as irrelevant because
what matters is what Officer Loken knew, not Mr. Raines's knowledge. Defendant argues that
Officer Loken was not aware that Mr. Raines saw many pink balloons on defendant's lap at the
time he approached defendant. Officer Loken only knew that Mr. Raines had seen something
suspicious that might be a drug deal. Officer Loken did not begin a level two stop, he arrested
defendant at the moment of the encounter. Officer Loken identified himself as a police officer,
and issued an order that was meant to completely restrict all movement without his
authorization. A reasonable person would believe he is under arrest, not detained for
investigatory purposes based upon the facts in this case. Defendant argues that even if this was
a detention and not an arrest, the seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment because
there was no reasonable suspicion to justify it~ Officer Loken had neither seen a crime
committed nor had one been described to him. All Officer Loken knew was there was a
suspicious person possibly involved in a drug deal. There were no exigent circumstances to
justify Officer Loken's intrusion on defendant. There was no potential destruction of evidence
because when defendant pushed what was on his lap to the floor, there is no indication that in
this way any items would have been destroyed. This action did not justify Officer Loken in
jumping into the passenger window, seizing Mr. Hinmon's arms, handcuffing him and wrestling
him to the curb. The method of search was not reasonable. Defendant argues that the balloon
was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure and therefore should be
suppressed.
The single question of whether the balloon is fruit of the poisonous tree that should be
suppressed turns on several issues which the Court will address below.
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LEVEL TWO INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION
The first issue is whether Officer Loken's and Mr. Worthington's initial encounter with
~I

defendant was a level two investigative detention or a level three arrest. While Officer Loken
was observing the occupants of the green Geo through the passenger window, the driver
looked over toward defendant and saw Officer Loken. She seemed startled. Defendant turned
and looked at Officer Loken, who said, "Don't move."
Defendant argues this statement amounted to an arrest. The Court disagrees. The
statement, "don't move," does not amount to an arrest, rather this statement is an assertion of
official authority associated with a level two detention. Circumstances that might indicate that
a level two detention has occurred include "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Salt Lake City v. Ray, supra, 2000
UT App. at ,i 11. When Officer Loken said, "Don't move," he indicated to defendant and the
driver that compliance with his request might be compelled. When Officer Loken said, "Don't
move," he made an official show of authority that a reasonable person would interpret as a
command to restrict his movements and that he was not free to disregard the officer's request
or otherwise carry on with his business. The Court concludes that defendant was detained at
that time, so the Court must next determine whether Officer Loken had adequate grounds to
justify detaining defendant.

REASONABLE SUSPICION
In order to justify a level two investigative detention, the Fourth Amendment requires
that "the totality of the circumstances show reasonably articulable suspicion that a crime had
been committed or was being committed as supported by the specific, articulable facts, which,
together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting a person
detained is engaged in criminal activity." An officer's suspicion "cannot be merely an inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' .... However, '[a] determination that reasonable
suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.' ... Indeed, 'the
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard."' State v. Markland,
2005 UT 26, 'f]lO, 112 P.3d 507, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 34. Courts must "judge the officer's
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conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience and ... accord deference to
an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."

kl at ,Ill.

The

court should not unduly emphasize the possibility of an innocent explanation of the facts
witnessed by the officer or follow an overly formalistic approach to the type of testimony that
an officer must supply in detention cases.

!fh at ,I16.

Officer Loken's and Mr. Worthington's approach to the Geo was based upon Mr.
Raines's tip. Mr. Raines was a citizen informant. An informant's tip constitutes reasonable
suspicion to justify a detention or seizure of a vehicle and its occupants "if the information [(1)]
is reliable, [(2)] provides sufficient detail of criminal activity, and [(3)] is confirmed by the
investigation officer." State v. Prows, 2007 UT App. 409, ';114, 178 P.3d 908, 594 Utah Adv. Rep.

21.
Under the first factor of the citizen informant test, Mr. Raines's tip was reliable because
Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington knew him and his identifying information. Mr. Raines was
an uncompensated citizen informant and there were no special circumstances present to
indicate that the tip was untrustworthy. Thus, Mr. Raines's tip was "highly reliable." See e.g.,

,i1s.
Under the second factor of the citizen informant test, Mr. Raines must provide "enough
detail about the criminal activity, i.e., illegal activity observed, description of the vehicle, license
number and location to support reasonable suspicion." ~ at ~16. Mr. Raines was an
employee at the same store as Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington. Mr. Raines pointed out the
vehicle in the parking lot and informed Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington that: (1) he noticed
a green Geo was backed into the stall, (2) on the west side of the building where employees
parked, (3) there were two occupants of the Geo, (4) the occupants of the Geo behaved in a
suspicious manner when Mr. Raines looked at them, (5) he observed defendant had a towel on
his lap, (6) he observed defendant had pink balloons on his lap, (7) he observed defendant
moving and manipulating the pink balloons in his lap, (8) based upon his experience, he
suspected the balloons contained drugs, (9) based upon his experience, he suspected there was
a drug transaction happening in the green Geo, and (10) he believed the Geo was backed into
the stall for a quick get-away. The information Mr. Raines gave Officer Loken and Mr.
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Worthington was sufficiently detailed to satisfy the second factor to establish reasonable
suspicion.
Under the third factor of the citizen informant test, a tip is a sufficient basis for
reasonable suspicion if "the officer can corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal
activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the
informant."

& at ,t18.

Mr. Raines pointed out the green Geo to Officer Loken and Mr.

Worthington. Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington approached the Geo with the intention of
seeing what was going on and armed with the information Mr. Raines had given them.
Specifically, when Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington approached the vehicle, they knew: (1)
Mr. Raines noticed a green Geo was backed into the stall, (2) on the west side of the building
where employees parked, (3) there were two occupants of the Geo, (4) the occupants of the
Geo behaved suspicious when Mr. Raines looked at them, (5) Mr. Raines observed defendant
had a towel on his lap, (6) Mr. Raines observed defendant had pink balloons on his lap, (7) Mr.
Raines observed defendant moving and manipulating the pink balloons in his lap, (8) based
upon his experience, Mr. Raines suspected the balloons contained drugs, (9) based upon his
experience, Mr. Raines suspected there was a drug transaction happening in the green Geo,
and (10) Mr. Raines believed the Geo was backed into the stall for a quick get-away.
Officer Loken approached the rear of the Geo, without being noticed, and was able to
look in over the shoulder of the passenger into the passenger compartment of the car. Officers
support their reasonably articulable suspicion based upon their training and experience that
they suspect illegal activity. For example, officers have asserted reasonably articulable
2

suspicion based upon their observations: that verify citizen informant statements, of vehicle
occupants,3 of aspects of the vehicle itself,4 of the vehicle's position and location.5 Officer
Loken verified several of Mr. Raines observations with his own. Officer Loken saw (1) the green
Geo was backed up into the stall, (2) the Geo was parked on the west side where employees
2

State v. Prows, 2007 UT App. 409, 1114, 178 P.3d 908, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 21.
State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App. 291, ,18, 141 P.3d 602, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; State v. Beach,
2002 UT App. 160, ,J9, 47 P.3d 932, 447 Utah Adv. Rep. 17.
4
State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App. 291, ,t8; see also State v. Beach, supra, 2002 UT App. at ffl9;
State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (UT App. 1992).
5
State v. Beach, supra, 2002 UT App. at '1]9; see also State v. Smith, supra, 833 P.2d at 372.
3
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parked, (3) the Geo was positioned for a quick get-away, (4) there were two occupants in the
Geo, (5) there was a towel across defendant's lap, and (6) defendant was manipulating
something in the towel on his lap. Officer Loken found the people, the vehicle and the location
substantially as described by Mr. Raines. Although Officer Loken could not see the balloons or
drugs, the fact that the citizen informant, Mr. Raines, saw them and a majority of his
statements were verified by Officer Loken's own observations, the third factor regarding
corroboration is satisfied. In sum, because all three factors regarding sufficiency of a citizen
informant's tip are satisfied, the Court concludes that Officer Loken had reasonable articulable
suspicion to effectuate a level two encounter. The totality of the circumstances show
reasonably articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed or was being committed as
supported by the specific, articulable facts, which, together with objective and reasonable
inferences, form a basis for suspecting defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The Court
concludes the level two investigative detention was justified.

WARRANTLESS ARREST
Officer Loken's physical restraint of defendant was effectively a warrantless arrest.
When a person is physically stopped or restrained by an officer, he is arrested. California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551-52, 113 L. Ed 2d 690 (1991). When Officer Loken
physically restrained defendant, he arrested defendant.
To make a lawful arrest, an officer must have probable cause to support the arrest. For
Officer Loken's arrest of defendant to be lawful, there must be probable cause to believe that a
felony hads been committed or was being committed in his presence. "To determine whether
an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the
arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount ta1 probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366,371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). "Probable cause is an objective standard.
Officers' subjective beliefs, no matter how sincere, about whether they have probable cause,
standing alone, neither constitute probable cause nor foreclose a finding of probable cause."
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 {UT App. 1995). As long as probable cause existed at the
time of the arrest, the reason the officer stated for the arrest is not controlling. Devenpeck v.
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Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004). An officer's subjective
reasons for making an arrest are irrelevant when objective reasons support the arrest.

!.f!.:.

"Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a common sense assessment of the
totality of the circumstances confronting the arresting or searching officer. Probable cause is
more than suspicion but less than certainty." State v. Spurgeon, supra, 904 P.2d at 226.
In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical
considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved.
The quantum of evidence needed for probable cause is significantly less
than that needed to prove guilt.... Utah appellate courts have observed that
probable cause does not require more than a rationally based conclusion of
probability, ... and that probable cause is only probability, and not prima fade
showing, of criminal activity.

lfL. at 226-27 (citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted}.
"[D]eliberatively furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers
are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in
the decision to make an arrest." State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (UT App. 1989){citing
Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S. ct. 1889, 1904:.os, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 {1968). Acts of
"concealment or 'furtive movement' ... are certainly relevant in establishing probable cause to
associate an object with criminal activity." State v. Holmes, supra, 774 P.2d at 511 (citing
Sibron v. New York, supra, 392 U.S. at 66-67.
An objective, common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances
confronting Officer Loken provided more than suspicion but less than certainty that a crime had
been or was being committed. Officer Loken told the occupants of the Geo, "Don't move."
Defendant's reaction was to lunge for the floor, pushing everything off of his lap, and to yell
"take off, take off," and "Just drive, just drive" while he was reaching for the gear shift to put
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the car in drive. An officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his training and experience in
detecting crime and to make "common sense conclusions about human behavior." United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed 2d 1 (1989). When a police
officer makes a level two investigative detention and a person reacts with a deliberate, full
body movement to push everything off of his lap, in a way that hides what is in his lap,
deliberately yelling to the driver, "take off, take off," and "just drive, just drive," while he was
reaching for the gear shift to put the car in drive, the common sense conclusion about the
person's behavior is that there is criminal activity. Observing a person yell "take off, take off,"
and "just drive, just drive," coupled with the person reaching for the gear shift to put the car in
drive, along with the person lunging to the floor, pushing everything off of his lap, in a way that
hides what is in his lap, would have an objectively reasonable police officer believing that there

is a high probability that there is criminal activity. Examining all of the events leading up to the
arrest, including from the moment Mr. Raines reported what he saw to Officer Loken to the
moment Officer Loken grabbed defendant, these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of
an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause that a crime has been
committed or is being committed. The Court concludes that Officer Loken lawfully arrested
defendant.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH
While Officer Loken was arresting defendant, Mr. Worthington observed defendant
shove his hand in his mouth and as he did it, a little pink balloon bounced into the rear seat of
the Geo. Mr. Worthington grabbed the pink balloon and, after defendant was handcuffed and
removed from the Geo, he gave it to Officer Loken. Defendant challenges Mr. Worthington's
warrantless search.
An exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. "(A]n
arresting officer may, without a warrant, search a person validly arrested.'1 State v. Trane, 2002
UT 97, ,J23, 57 P.3d 1052, 456 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. "For a search incident to arrest to be
constitutional, the underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need to be supported by an
arrest warrant." State v. Trane, 2002 UT at ~23. "Under this exception, any evidence, including
all evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other than that for which the suspect is
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arrested, is admissible in a criminal trial." ~ In 2009, the United States Supreme Court
decision Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) issued a
decision narrowing the situation "in which officers can conduct a search incident to arrest to
times 'when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search 1 or when the police could expect to find evidence of the
offense for which the arrestee had been arrested." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,i,i 20-21, 229
P.3d 650, 651 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. "[T]he practical effect of Gant is to prohibit searches of a
vehicle incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant absent additional justification." 1£!:_
In this case, as stated earlier, Officer Loken had probable cause to arrest defendant,
therefore it was lawful. Applying the search incident to arrest exception narrowly as provided
in Gant, the issues are (1) whether the defendant was unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, and/or (2) whether the police could
expect to find evidence of the offense for which the arrestee had been arrested.
While Officer Loken was attempting to arrest defendant, he struggled harder against
Officer Loken's restraint to the point he twisted up over "lurched to the back uh the backseat
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so his head was in the back of the car with his feet on the passenger seat. Officer Loken had a
hold of defendant's left hand, but not his right. Officer Loken kept saying things to defendant
like, "Quit resisting us. Give me your hands. You're under arrest." Mr. Worthington recalled
Officer Loken kept telling defendant to "Stop. I'm police. Stop, you need to quit resisting. Quit
resisting .... Stop resisting arrest." Mr. Worthington observed defendant shove his
unrestrained hand in his mouth and as he did it, a little pink balloon bounced into the rear seat
of the Geo. Mr. Worthington, grabbed the pink balloon and, after defendant was handcuffed
and removed from the Geo, he gave it to Officer Loken. These facts fit squarely within the first
narrow Gant exception. The defendant was unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time Mr. Worthington grabbed the pink balloon, which he
witnessed defendant drop into the back seat while defendant was swallowing or trying to
swallow the drug filled pink balloons. The Court concludes the pink balloon was obtained
lawfully as a search incident to arrest.
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In summary, the Court concludes the initial encounter was a level two investigative

detention with reasonably articulable suspicion, which escalated into an arrest with probable
cause that a crime had been committed or was being committed, and a search incident to a
lawful arrest resulted in a pink balloon that tested positive for heroin. The Court concludes the
exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress the pink bal!oon and test results because the
evidence was not obtained unlawfully and therefore is not fruit of the poisonous tree.
ORDER
The Court DENIES defendant's Motion to Suppress for Unconstitutional Search and
Seizure. This is the FINAL ORDER of the Court. No additional orders are necessary.
Date:

4j ~

I ?bl4

23

0000192

